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Abstract—With the development of sensor network, mobile
computing, and web applications, data are now collected from
many distributed sources to form big datasets. Such datasets
can be hosted in the cloud to achieve economical processing.
However, these data might be highly sensitive requiring secure
storage and processing. We envision a cloud-based data storage
and processing framework that enables users to economi-
cally and securely share and handle big datasets. Under this
framework, we study the matrix-based data mining algorithms
with a focus on the secure top-k eigenvector algorithm. Our
approach uses an iterative processing model in which the
authorized user interacts with the cloud to achieve the result.
In this process, both the source matrix and the intermediate
results keep confidential and the client-side incurs low costs.
The security of this approach is guaranteed by using Paillier
Encryption and a random perturbation technique. We carefully
analyze its security under a cloud-specific threat model. Our
experimental results show that the proposed method is scalable
to big matrices while requiring low client-side costs.
Keywords-cloud computing; big matrix; power iteration;
MapReduce; security; performance;
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development and wide deployment of web
services, mobile applications, and sensor networks, data are
now collected from many distributed sources to form big
datasets. For example, users of mobile devices are becoming
“citizen sensors” [10] to generate information about the
world via tools like Twitter and location-based services.
Such datasets have become a valuable asset to the data
owner. This paradigm raises a number of challenges for data
storage, sharing, and analysis.
• Most data collectors, such as mobile devices and sen-
sors, have very limited resources to store and process
data. Thus, the data have to be sent to servers or clouds.
• The collected data may be highly sensitive. So it
becomes necessary to transfer, store, and process them
securely.
• Users might be authorized by the data owner to use
the data. Processing and analyzing the secured big data
will require a huge amount of computing resources to
be allocated on demand, where cloud computing is the
ideal platform.
With these problems in mind, we envision a cloud-based
data storage and processing framework that enables users to
economically and securely share and handle big matrices
collected from distributed sources. The data owners and
data consumers do not need to own powerful computational
infrastructures - they need only a PC to interact with the
cloud infrastructure to economically finish the data intensive
computing.
The key problem of this framework is the security of
data. The data owner loses the control of the data once
the data are exported to the cloud. For many reasons, such
as a compromised cloud infrastructure or insider attacks
conducted by the provider’s employees, the cloud provider
may not be considered a trusted party. Storing data securely
is trivial, but processing data securely in the cloud is very
challenging because the underlying infrastructure is owned
by the untrusted cloud provider. Our framework aims to
enable the trusted parties to securely conduct computation
on encrypted data on top of untrusted cloud infrastructures.
The most relevant approach is fully homomorphic en-
cryption [9], [15], which, however, is too expensive to be
practical. As users expect to use the cloud to minimize the
client-side costs, in general, approaches, which demand high
costs on communication and the client side, cannot be moved
to the cloud setting (Section V for more details).
Scope and Contributions. Securely sharing, analyzing,
and mining datasets in the cloud is a rather broad issue. In
this paper, we study a specific problem with the proposed
framework: matrix-based data mining, and more specifically,
we focus on the secure and efficient iterative methods for
finding the approximate top-k eigenvectors of a secured large
matrix in the cloud.
Eigendecomposition [19] has broad applications in many
important areas including information retrieval [7] and
PageRank [4] for ranking web search results. The com-
mon algorithm to find all eigenvectors will cost O(n3) in
time complexity, which is prohibitively expensive for large
dimensionality n. When the matrix is large, the iterative
methods (i.e., power-iteration based methods [1], [6]) are
used to find the approximate top-k eigenvectors instead. The
most expensive step of the iterative methods is the matrix-
vector multiplication.
In the proposed framework, we use the partially homo-
morphic Paillier encryption system [17] to encrypt the values
which enables the processing of encrypted data in the cloud.
The data owner manages the keys and owns the data in
the cloud. At the data owner’s request, the data collectors
encrypt vectors (e.g., describing the interactions in social
network or preferences over books) and submit them to
the cloud to form the big matrix. The data owner or the
authorized data consumer, who has only limited computing
resources, then interacts with the cloud to conduct an itera-
tive computation to find the approximate top-k eigenvectors.
The core component of this framework is the secure
matrix-vector multiplication between the encrypted matrix
stored in the cloud and the vector provided by the client.
Paillier encryption is used to enable computations over
encrypted data in the cloud, which is much more efficient
than the existing fully homomorphic encryption methods
[9]. However, it can only provide homomorphic addition,
handicapped for homomorphic matrix computation. We de-
velop an efficient perturbation-based protocol to overcome
this problem and ensure no information is leaked in the
computation. It also guarantees low costs in the trusted client
side (the data owner, data collectors, and the authorized data
consumers) to fully take advantage of cloud computing. We
also develop a MapReduce program to process the secure
matrix-vector multiplication to fully exploit the parallelism
and scalability enabled by the cloud platform.
An extensive evaluation has been conducted on the pro-
posed method. The result shows that the cloud-side parallel
processing on encrypted data is efficient and scalable, and
the client-side costs are quite acceptable.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section II gives background knowledge about the
proposed approach, including a brief description on the
Paillier encryption system, the power iteration methods, and
the MapReduce programming model. Section III describes
the design of the approach and also analyzes its correctness,
security, and costs. Section IV presents the results of experi-
mental evaluation with a focus on the storage and computing
costs in both the cloud and client sides. Section V shows
some related work on secure computation in the cloud.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In the following, we will briefly describe our notation
and background knowledge about eigenvalue decomposition,
Paillier encryption, and MapReduce programming.
Notation For clear presentation, we will use Greek char-
acters to represent scalars, lower case letters for vectors,
indexed lower case letters for the elements in the vector,
and capital letters for matrices or submatrices. In particular,
Z
n
q represents the group of n-dimensional vectors of integers
with moduluo q. We use {bi}, i = 1..k to denote a set of
vectors (or values).
Power Iteration for Eigenvalue Decomposition. Finding
eigenvalues and eigenvectors of a square matrix has many
important applications in science and engineering domains.
In particular, eigenvalue decomposition has been an impor-
tant tool in data analysis. For example, Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) depends on eigenvalue decomposition [11].
In information retrieval, it is used to find the relationship
between words and documents on a text corpus [7]. Google’s
patented PageRank technique[4] is also related to eigenvalue
decomposition.
The matrices from these applications are normally very
large. Thus, the direct computation method that costs O(n3)
is not a viable option. Instead, for large matrices, power
iteration based methods, such as the Arnoldi [1] and Lanczos
methods [6], are used for finding the top-k eigenvectors.
Assume A, A ∈ Rn×n, is a n × n real matrix and b0 is a
random n-dimensional vector. We sketch these methods in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Framework of Power Iteration Methods
1: b0 ← random n-D vector;
2: for i ← 1 to k do
3: bi ← Abi−1/||Abi−1||;
4: other operations of cost O(n) specific to the Arnoldi
or Lanczos methods.
5: end for
6: Post-processing with a cost O(n) to generate eigenvec-
tors.
Note that in this iterative framework, the most expensive
operation is the line bi ← Abi−1/||Abi−1||. Other opera-
tions are only related to processing bi and some auxiliary
k × k matrix. Usually, only a few eigenvectors are needed
and thus k is typically small (e.g., k=10). The remaining
computations, specific to the Arnoldi and Lanczos methods
cost only O(kn). With the matrix stored in the cloud, we
can let the cloud take care of the most expensive part while
the client handles the remaining low-cost steps.
Paillier Encryption. Fully homomorphic encryption aims
to allow addition and multiplication to be conducted on
encrypted values without decryption. Paillier Encryption is
a partially homomorphic encryption scheme that is much
more efficient than the fully homomorphic ones [9], but only
preserves homomorphic addition, i.e.
E(x) + E(y) = E(x+ y). (1)
Multiplication cannot be implemented on top of E(x) and
E(y) in Paillier encryption. However, with one operand not
encrypted, say y, multiplication can still be implemented as
E(xy) = E(x) mod power y, (2)
where mod power means the modulo power operation [12].
For simplicity of presentation, we use (E(x))y to represent
E(x) mod power y. It has been proven that Paillier Encryp-
tion has strong security guarantee, satisfying the definition
of semantic security.
Therefore, to implement more complicated operations
with Paillier encryption, one has to expose one of the
operands which becomes the security hole. Finding a way
to limit the exposure and maintain data privacy will be one
of the challenging tasks in the application.
III. SECURE TOP-K EIGENVECTOR COMPUTATION IN
THE CLOUD
In this section, we will describe the major components
in our approach. We begin with the general computational
framework and describe the roles of the client and cloud
components. Next, we present the security/threat model and
discuss our assumptions and potential attack points. We fol-
low with the secure power iteration algorithm that is built up
with Paillier encryption and random perturbation. Then, we
briefly discuss the cloud-side MapReduce algorithm. Finally,
we formally analyze the security and cost of the proposed
approach. We show that our approach can minimize the
cost of the client-side computation while providing excellent
performance for processing big matrices with strong security
guarantee.
A. Computational Framework
Our framework involves four parties: cloud, data owner,
data collectors, and authorized data users. It reflects the
highly distributed nature in data intensive computing where
collecting data, storing data, and processing data might be
handled by different distributed parties.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship and interaction be-
tween these parties. The non-cloud parties: the data owner,
the data collectors/contributors, and the authorized users are
trusted. The data owner controls all rights to the data, dis-
tributes public keys, and asks the data collectors/contributors
to upload the collected data which are encrypted by a
public key. The data owner can process the pooled data by
him/herself or authorize other users to use the encrypted
data. Each data collector may contribute a small part of
the data, e.g., a row of the matrix. Practical examples may
include the interactions with other users or the recommen-
dations on items during a period. The data owner or the
authorized users can interact with the cloud to conduct
matrix analysis tasks. Note that encrypted data will have
a size much larger than the original one. The authorized
users cannot afford to download the encrypted big matrix
and conduct computations locally. Instead, they want to fully
utilize the benefits of cloud computing and minimize the
client-side cost.
B. Threat Model
Assumptions. Our security analysis is built on the impor-
tant features of the discussed architecture. Under this setting,
we believe the following assumptions are appropriate.
• The cloud provider is not trustable and may silently
observe the data and the computation to find useful
information, e.g., the eigenvectors.
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Figure 1. Framework for conducting matrix mining with the cloud.
• Only the data owner and the authorized users can use
the proprietary matrix. The data owner authorizes some
trusted users to use the data. They will not intentionally
breach the confidentiality. We consider insider attacks
to be orthogonal to our research.
• The client-side system and the communication channels
are properly secured and no part of the confidential
matrix or the computation results can be leaked.
• Adversaries can see the secured matrix and the submit-
ted plaintext vectors for secure matrix-vector computa-
tion, but nothing else.
These assumptions can be maintained and reinforced by
applying appropriate security policies.
Protected Assets. Data confidentiality is the central issue
in our approach. While the integrity of data and computation
is also an important issue, it is orthogonal to our study.
Due to the space limitation, we will not cover data and
computation integrity techniques [20], which are typically
used to prevent adversaries from actively tampering with the
data or computation. Therefore we can assume the “honest
but curious” adversary model.
Attacker’s goal. The attacker is interested in recovering
(or estimating) the matrix elements and the computing result,
i.e., the eigenvectors and eigenvalues.
Security Definition. The protected matrix is indistin-
guishable to chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA). The sub-
mitted plaintext vectors in the computation are no different
from random samples uniformly drawn from a sufficiently
large vector space (with O(2K) elements in the set, if K
is the number of bits for encoding). The protocol will not
reveal any additional information.
C. Data Collection
Representation of Data. In order to use the Paillier
encryption system all data need to be converted to non-
negative big integers [17]. However, in practice, we process
matrices in the real value domain. A valid method to
preserve the desired precision, e.g., d decimal places, is to
multiply the original value by 10d to scale up the values
and drop the remaining decimal places. In addition, we
also need to shift the values so that the domain is positive.
This process is clearly reversible so that the results can be
correctly recovered. With a typical key length of 1024, we
have enough digits to preserve the precision.
Submitting data. To prepare for collecting data, the data
owner will generate one n-dimensional random vector b0,
b0 ∈ Z
n
q . b0 is then encrypted with the Paillier public key:
E(b0) = (E(b01) . . . E(b0n)), which is then distributed to
the data collectors.
The data collectors submit their row(s) of the matrix,
denoted as Ai for the collector i, in the encrypted form to
the cloud storage. In addition, they also calculate the result
of E(Aib0) with the following homomorphic method and
submit it to the data owner. Assume a is one row of Ai
E(ab0) =
n∑
k=1
E(akb0k) =
n∑
k=1
(E(b0k))
ak , (3)
Note that the number of elements in E(Aib0) is the same
as the number of rows to be submitted to the cloud by the
collector, which is typically one. Finally, the data owner
collects all E(Aib0) and decrypts them to find Ab0.
D. Secure Power Iteration Protocol
To protect the plaintext vectors submitted to the cloud
in power iteration, the authorized data user must perform
a few steps to prepare for the perturbation approach. Then,
the client side collaborates with the cloud side to finish the
secure matrix-vector multiplication in the iterations.
Preparing the Perturbation Pool. The authorized data
user will receive E(b0), E(Ab0), and the decryption key
from the data owner, and then select m n-dimensional
random vectors, where m is small, say m = 5, and send
them to the cloud. These random vectors will be used to
perturb and protect the vectors {bi} in each iteration. Let’s
denote them as the seed random vectors {si}, for i=1..m,
si ∈ Z
n
q .
For each random vector si, a secure computation of Asi
is performed in the cloud as follows. With the homomorphic
properties of Pailier encryption, for the j-th element of the
resultant vector (Asi)j , we have
E((Asi)j) = E(
n∑
k=1
Ajksik) =
n∑
k=1
(E(Ajk))
sik , (4)
where sik is the k-th element of the vector si and Ajk
is the element (j, k) of the matrix A. Note this secure
matrix-vector computation is also used later in each iteration.
The result E(Asi) is sent back to the client side and
decrypted for later processing. After the preparation stage,
the authorized user holds the random vectors S = {si} and
the resultant vectors AS = {Asi}, for i=1..m.
Iteration. The iteration stage starts with the random
vector b0, then applies the formula bk+1 = Abk/||Abk||
and other low-cost steps as described in the Arnoldi and
Lanczos methods. It is important to protect bi in each
iteration - otherwise, the eigenvectors are revealed. We apply
the following method to protect the privacy of computation,
the security of which will be analyzed in detail later.
To calculate E(Abi) from E(A) and bi with the Paillier
homomorphic operations, bi cannot be encrypted. We design
a perturbation method to protect bi before sending it to the
cloud. The basic idea is to use a random vector ri and send
b¯i = bi + ri mod q (5)
to the cloud instead, where q is a big random prime number
so that q is large enough to contain all the values in the
application domain. We design ri with the seed random
vectors generated during the preparation stage:
ri =
m∑
l=1
αilsl +
i−1∑
j=0
βijbj mod q, (6)
for i = 1..k, where αil and βij are randomly drawn from Zq .
The purpose of including bj, j = 0..i− 1 in perturbation is
to provide better security, which will be discussed later. As
the results, {Ask} and {Abj, j < i}, have been computed
in the preparation stage and the previous steps, Ari can be
conveniently calculated by
Ari =
m∑
k=1
αikAsk +
i−1∑
j=0
βjkAbjb mod q, (7)
with only the client-side vector operations (a O(n) cost).
Then, the cloud side will take b¯i = bi + ri mod q, apply
formula 4 to calculate E(Ab¯i), and send the result back. The
client side decrypts E(Ab¯i) to get Ab¯i. With Ari known,
we have Abi = Ab¯i − Ari mod q. Once we have Abi,
it is easy to calculate bi+1 = Abi/||Abi|| for the next
iteration. Additional operations (as described in the Arnoldi
and Lanczos methods) have a cost of O(kn), which can be
conveniently performed with only client-side operations.
E. Cloud-side MapReduce Computation
Data encrypted with Paillier encryption are significantly
larger than the unencrypted values. With a 1024-bit key,
a 64-bit double-type original value becomes a 2048-bit
encrypted one, a 32-time increase. This cost cannot be
avoided by using any encryption schemes based on the
assumption of Diffie-Hellman or large-integer factorization
[12]. This literally turns a common-size problem to a “big
data” problem, which requires us to exploit the parallel
processing power in the cloud.
With this problem in mind, we designed the MapReduce
version of homomorphic matrix-vector multiplication. The
client passes the perturbed vector b¯i as a parameter to the
MapReduce program and the cloud computes and returns
Ab¯i. Below we describe the MapReduce formulation of the
cloud-side computation of E(Ab¯i).
Algorithm 2 The MapReduce Matrix-Vector Multiplication
program on encrypted matrix
1: map(E(A˜), b¯i)
2: E(A˜): some rows of the encrypted matrix A that are
distributed to the specific Map; b¯i: the perturbed vector
sent by the client.
3: for each row of E(A˜): E(Aj) do
4: Emit(〈j,∑dk=1(E(Ajk))b¯ik〉)
5: end for
1: partition(j, nr)
2: j: the row number; nr: the total number of reduces.
3: return ⌊j/nr⌋;
1: reduce(〈j, v〉)
2: j: the row number; v: the result.
3: Emit(〈j, v〉);
The MapReduce program is rather straightforward. The
Map function applies the secure matrix-vector multiplication
formula (Eq. 4), and emits the results indexed by the row
number. The Map outputs are partitioned and sorted by
row number and sent to the corresponding identity Reducer
which writes the data segment to disk. Because we used
the binary representation for the encrypted elements of the
matrix, we also designed special input/output format classes
to handle the binary data.
F. Security Analysis
The proposed algorithm consists of three components (1)
data collection, (2) the random perturbation step in the client
side, and (3) the matrix-vector multiplication based on data
encrypted with the Paillier encryption scheme. Component
(1) and (3) are secure as long as the Paillier encryption is
secure. Thus, the security of the approach only depends on
that of component (2).
In perturbation preparation, the curious cloud provider
is able to collect the initial random seed vectors S =
(s1, . . . , sm) in the perturbation pool and the progressively
generated perturbed vectors {b¯i}. In addition, the adversary
could be aware that bi may converge to the dominant
eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue in k
iterations [19].
Security of {bi} in a single run. The first problem is
whether the adversary can gain additional information by
observing the known vectors {b¯i} and S. We want to show
that:
Proposition 1: The known {b¯i} and S do not reveal any
information about {bi}.
Proof: First, we prove the b¯1 case. Other cases are
similar. Let ai = (αi1, . . . , αik). Recall that Equation 5 is
b¯i = bi + ri = bi + Sai +
∑i−1
j=0 βijbj mod q for i = 1..k.
Thus, b¯1 = b1 + r1 = b1 + Sa1 + β1,0b0 mod q. With the
known b¯1 and unknown r1, it is clear that if the adversary
can guess b1 from any uniformly random sample drawn
from Znq with non-negligible advantage, then she/he can also
distinguish r1 from random vectors.
Let r1 be represented as r1 = Sa1 + e1 mod q, where
e1 = β1,0b0 and a1 is secret. If S, β1,0 and b0 are
drawn uniformly at random, the problem of distinguishing
< S, r1 > from uniformly random samples over Zn×mq ×Znq
is exactly the decision version of the Learning with Errors
(LWE) problem discussed by Regev [18]. It is already known
that such r1 cannot be distinguished from uniformly random
samples if e1 is randomly drawn and a1 are secret [18].
Therefore, b1 cannot be distinguished from uniformly ran-
dom samples as well. The same conclusion can be extended
to the cases of i > 1 with more unknowns included. We
skip the details here.
Because ri cannot be distinguished from uniformly ran-
dom samples, regardless of how bi appears (as bi will
look similar with sufficiently large i), {b¯i} cannot be
distinguished from any set of random vectors. Thus, the
series {b¯i} does not help the adversary gain any additional
information about {bi}.
Statistical Inference Attack. The curious cloud provider
may look at multiple runs of eigendecomposition conducted
by different users. As all users start with the same b0,
will the multiple runs provide an opportunity for statistical
inference? Below we describe an inference attack that looks
at the statistical property of the series and analyze the risk
under this attack.
Again, we start with the simplest case b¯1 = b1 + r1.
The statistical inference attack treats b¯1 and r1 as random
variables and tries to estimate E[b¯1] and var(b¯1) with
random samples. Theoretically, E[b¯1] = b1 + E[r1] and
var(b¯1) = var(r1). Correspondingly, the estimate bˆ1 =
E[b¯1]−E[r1]. In practice, this estimation has to depend on
N samples of b¯1: {b¯(i)1 , i = 1..N} observed by the attacker.
We want to show that:
Proposition 2: The proposed random perturbation
method is computationally secure to the statistical inference
attack.
Proof: We use the b¯1 case to prove the statement. Let’s
analyze the statistical property of r1 to see the effectiveness
of this attack. As shown in the earlier analysis, r1 cannot
be distinguished from a uniformly random sample in the
domain Znq . In the integer domain Zq , a uniformly random
variable v has a mean value E[v] = q/2 and variance
var(v) = q2/12. Thus, we can assume it is from the same
distribution and each element has the properties E[r1i] =
q/2 and var(r1i) = q2/12, for i = 1..N . The estimate bˆ1
of b1 can be established as bˆ1 = 1/N
∑N
i=1 b¯
(i)
1 − E[r1].
However, the accuracy of this estimate is determined by the
variance of b¯(i)1 , which has the same variance as var(r1).
With N independent samples the variance of bˆ1 is
var(bˆ1) = var(
1
N
N∑
i=1
b¯
(i)
1 ) =
1
N
var(b¯1) =
1
N
var(r1).
To gain sufficiently small variance for the estimation, the
number of samples N would be as large as Θ(q2). In the case
of using long integers, q2 will be in the range of 2128, which
can be further increased if a longer representation is used.
It is impractical that the authorized users will conduct this
number of computations. Therefore, the statistical inference
attack is ineffective.
G. Cost Analysis
The cost of the approach can be analyzed according to
the three parties we described.
Data Collector needs to encrypt one vector, which costs
O(n) value encryptions, conduct one homomorphic dot
product, which has a similar cost to vector encryption (see
Section IV), and transmit the encrypted vector to the cloud,
which has a cost of O(n). In total, its computational and
transmission costs are O(n).
Authorized User needs to prepare the perturbation pool,
which costs O(mn) in transmission and also O(mn) de-
cryptions, where m is small. In power iterations, it needs
O(kn) decryptions in total for getting the k eigenvectors,
and O(kn) space for storing the encrypted values. As k and
m are small, the client side costs are small - in general, a
PC can handle such a workload. This is an important feature
for users to fully enjoy the benefits of cloud computing.
Cloud Side has a O(n2) storage cost for encrypted matrix
elements, as well as computation costs on MapReduce-based
secure matrix-vector multiplication. Because the major cost
is on the Map phase, with p Map slots in the Hadoop
cluster, the total cost is about O(n2/p). The storage cost is
proportional to the number of encrypted values, and related
to the key size.
We will conduct extensive experiments to carefully eval-
uate these costs.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
To show the effectiveness of the proposed research, we
conducted a set of experiments to evaluate the efficiency of
processing in the three involved parties: the data collectors,
the authorized users, and the cloud.
A. Setup
The client machine is configured with 128 GB of
RAM and four quad-core AMD processors. The cloud-side
MapReduce program was tested using the Hadoop cluster
at Wright State University. The cluster is configured with
16 slave nodes running Apache Hadoop version 1.0.3. Each
slave node is configured with 16 GB of RAM, four quad-
core AMD processors, 16 map slots, 12 reduce slots, and
a 64MB HDFS block size. The cloud-side MapReduce
program was implemented with Java, and the client-side
programs with C++ and the GMP library (gmplib.org).
We use a 1024-bit key in our experiments. Paillier en-
cryption with key sizes less than 1024 is considered not
secure [14]. The experiments are conducted with simulated
matrices. Because the studied problem is fundamental and
general to all applications it is sufficient to use simulated
data. The original matrices use double values as the elements
(8 bytes per value). As discussed in section III-C, these
matrices are converted to long integers for encryption to
preserve sufficient precision. The encrypted matrices are
used as input to the MapReduce jobs in the power iteration
algorithm.
B. Data Collector Costs
Each data collector in the framework will generate one
vector (or a few), encrypt them, and deliver them to the
cloud. In addition, it will conduct the secured vector dot-
products for generating E(Aib0). Thus, the data collector’s
major costs are on vector encryption, secure vector dot-
products, and transmission. These costs are determined by
the basic cost of Paillier encryption (i.e., the key size) and
the number of dimensions.
Encoding Encrypt Dot Product Size Compressed(sec) (ms) (bytes) (bytes)
Text 56 3.7 6.1M 3.5M
Binary 56 3.7 2.5M 2.5M
Table I
DATA COLLECTOR COSTS FOR A 10,000-DIMENSION VECTOR.
We use the binary encoding scheme to minimize the size
of encrypted data, which also minimizes communication and
cloud storage. Basically, the size of an encrypted value in
binary representation has twice the size of the encryption
key, e.g. a 64-bit double-type value will become 2048-bit
encrypted value with a 1024-bit key. We show a simple
comparison using a 1024-bit key for a 10,000-dimension
vector in Table I.
Compared to the binary representation, a naive text repre-
sentation of big integers without compression will cost about
150% more in space (and 40% more with compression)
but the computation time is about the same. The binary
representation does not significantly compress due to the
randomized nature of encrypted values.
C. Client-side Costs in Iterations
In each iteration of the proposed algorithm, the client side
will receive the encrypted vector E(Ab¯i) from the cloud, de-
crypt it, regenerate a plaintext perturbed vector, and submit
it for the next iteration. We will evaluate the communication,
memory, and computation costs of the corresponding steps.
The communication costs consist of receiving the en-
crypted vector from the cloud and sending the plaintext
perturbed vector back to the cloud. We use the number of
bytes to represent these costs. According to the previous
discussion, an encrypted vector of 10,000 dimensions will
cost 2.56M bytes, which needs to be transmitted to the client
side. In comparison, the returned plain vector of 10,000
long integers has 80K bytes. These sizes are also linearly
proportional to the number of dimensions.
The computational steps include decrypting the vector and
constructing the new plaintext vector. Let the perturbation
pool contain 10 randomly generated vectors. Table II shows
the cost distribution with different dimensions. As observed,
decryption takes most of the time. Since decryption can be
easily done in parallel with a multicore processor, this cost
can be further reduced.
Dimension E(Ab¯i) size Decrypt E(Ab¯i) Other processing
10000 2.56MB 31s 5ms
30000 7.68MB 94s 16ms
50000 12.8MB 149s 26ms
Table II
CLIENT COMPUTATION COSTS FOR VARIOUS VECTOR DIMENSIONS.
The memory cost consists of the encrypted vector and
the plain vectors in the perturbation pool. According to
the algorithm, after each iteration, the resultant bi will be
added to the perturbation pool. However, since the number of
iterations is normally small, the pool requires only a limited
amount of memory. For example, with 10,000 dimensions
and a pool size of 10, 10 iterations need only about 2M
bytes of memory to hold the plain long integer vectors.
D. Cloud-side Costs
The cloud side has major costs in storing the encrypted
data and computing the secure matrix-vector multiplication.
Note that encrypted data has significantly larger size. It is
impractical for an authorized user to download and process
the data locally. We show some real numbers in Table III to
give a more concrete idea of the problem scale.
Matrix dimension Unencrypted (GB) Encrypted (GB)
10000 0.8 25.8
30000 7.2 232.0
50000 20.0 645.0
Table III
STORAGE COST FOR MATRICES ENCRYPTED WITH A 1024-BIT KEY.
Clearly, data in such scales cannot be processed using
traditional methods. Instead, we have to fully exploit the
parallel processing power in the cloud. The cloud side com-
putation consists of the secure matrix-vector multiplication.
The matrix is stored in the form of row vector sets and split
into data blocks of 64MB in the Hadoop file system. The
MapReduce framework assigns each block to a Map. This
allows sets of vector-vector dot products to occur in parallel.
Because the expensive operations happen in the Map phase,
the number of Maps determines the overall performance.
Figure 2 shows the cost increase trend with different sizes
of encrypted matrices. With the number of dimensions less
than 10,000, the Map phase can be done in one round with
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Figure 2. MapReduce costs of one encrypted matrix-vector
computation. Processing cost is approximately determined by the
number of Map rounds.
the in-house Hadoop cluster. With more dimensions, more
Map rounds are needed and the total time cost is proportional
to the number of Map rounds. On average each Map round
costs about 30-40 seconds. This shows great scalability. As
we increase the size of the cluster (with more Map slots) to
maintain one Map round, the overall cost will stay constant
(around 40 seconds as shown in the figure).
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Figure 3. A summary of the cloud-side and client-side costs
shows low client-side cost and the cloud-side efficiency due to the
optimized MapReduce implementation.
The overall cost distribution over the cloud and the client
side for one iteration using the in-house cluster is shown
in Figure 3. With increased dimensions, the cloud-side cost
dominates the overall cost.
V. RELATED WORK
A framework for securely outsourcing general compu-
tations is given in [8]. However, this framework is based
on Gentry’s fully homomorphic encryption scheme [9] ren-
dering it impractical due to the high computational costs
and ciphertext sizes. A simple test with the Scarab FHE
library (hcrypt.com/scarab-library) yielded ciphertext sizes
more than ten times those generated using Paillier [17].
Very recent work by Naehrig et al. [15] propose a secure
outsourcing solution for problems which only require the
encryption scheme to be “somewhat” homomorphic (SHE).
They use the SHE scheme of [3] which provides reasonably
efficient computational performance but still suffers from
large ciphertexts.
Atallah et al. [2] use a more directed approach and
present secure outsourcing solutions that are specific to large
scale systems of linear equations and matrix multiplication
applications. These solutions fall short in that they leak pri-
vate information, depend on multiple non-colluding servers,
and require a large communication overhead, respectively.
Wang et al. [20] use an iterative approach for solving
linear equations via client-cloud collaboration. However,
their approach has several weaknesses. First, their approach
requires that the entire unencrypted matrix be present at the
client side. Secondly, the client side must perform a problem
transformation step with a computation cost of O(n2). These
weaknesses render the approach impractical for big matrices
and do not fully utilize the benefit of the cloud.
Secure multiparty computation (SMC) solutions [16], [5],
[13] currently exist for various linear algebra problems. In
general, the SMC solutions do not translate well to the secure
outsourcing scenario. Each of the SMC parties typically
holds a share of the data in plaintext form and conducts
computation with it. In our approach, the cloud holds the
encrypted data. In addition, the SMC approaches normally
have high communication overhead between the parties,
which is not desired in cloud-based computing.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present an iterative processing approach
for finding top-k eigenvectors from encrypted data in the
cloud. The security of this approach is implemented with
the Paillier encryption system and an efficient random vector
perturbation. It is carefully designed so that the client-
side computation cost is minimized. We also develop a
MapReduce program to efficiently process the cloud-side
encrypted matrix-vector multiplication. The experimental
results demonstrate the storage and computational costs
needed to setup and use the proposed approach and show
the scalability of the design.
In future work, we will optimize our algorithm for sparse
matrices and formulate techniques to detect dishonest or lazy
service providers.
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